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Richard T. Ely, the first Secretary of the 
American Economic Association and its sixth 
President, was born in 1854 near Buffalo, NY. 
He had an unusually long and productive career. 
He retired from Northwestern University at the 
age of 79, after being recruited at the age of 
72 from the University of Wisconsin, where he 
had spent 33 years on the faculty. When Ely 
died at the age of 89, he had outlived all but 
about 1 percent of the men in his birth cohort, 
according to the life tables for white men born 
in the United States in the 1850s compiled by 
Hacker (2010). Times have changed. For the 
2010 US birth cohort, Bell and Miller (2005) 
forecast that 35 percent of men will reach their 
89th birthday and that 2 percent will live to cel-
ebrate their 102nd birthday.
Longer life expectancy, brought about 
by dramatic reductions in infant mortality 
in the early twentieth century and by ongo-
ing improvements in mid-life and old-age 
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 mortality in more recent decades, has pro-
found  economic consequences for individuals 
as they engage in lifecycle planning, and for 
economies as the average age of their popula-
tion rises. This paper focuses on the challenges 
that an aging population will pose for retire-
ment saving in the United States. It is divided 
into eight sections. Section I provides a brief 
overview of falling mortality rates at older 
ages. It highlights their implications for lifecy-
cle planning as well as the substantial hetero-
geneity in mortality improvements in different 
parts of the income distribution. Section II 
explores the macroeconomic consequences of 
population aging, drawing heavily on the find-
ings of a recent study by the National Research 
Council (2012). Section III shifts attention to 
financial support for retirement, describing 
the wide variation in the sources of income 
for the US population over the age of 65. Just 
as with mortality improvements, heterogene-
ity is key. There are large differences between 
the upper and lower strata of the income dis-
tribution in their retirement finances. Section 
IV shifts from income to wealth, and describes 
the balance sheets of elderly households. 
Section V documents the changes over the last 
three decades in the employer-provided pen-
sion system in the private sector and how that 
has affected retirement preparation. Section 
VI explores the relationship between an indi-
vidual’s saving rate while working, career 
length, rates of return, and the income replace-
ment rate in retirement. It reports calculations 
that underscore the challenge of providing for 
lengthy retirement periods in an economic 
environment that offers low long-term rates 
of return. Section VII describes strategies for 
promoting saving, highlighting recent findings 
on automatic enrollment and other approaches 
derived from behavioral economics. There is a 
brief conclusion.
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I. Longer Lifespan: The Changing Setting for 
Retirement Planning
Rising life expectancies, in the United States 
and around the world, are one of the most 
extraordinary achievements of the twentieth 
century. Table 1 shows that a US man born in 
1900 had a life expectancy of 51.5 years, and 
less than a 50 percent chance of reaching age 65. 
A century later, a newborn male was projected 
to have a life expectancy of 80 years, and an 86 
percent chance of celebrating his 65th birthday. 
For a woman, the gains were nearly as large. In 
1900, a newborn female’s life expectancy was 
58.3 years and she had a 57.8 percent chance of 
reaching her 65th birthday. In 2000, life expec-
tancy at birth was 84.2 years and the probabil-
ity of reaching the age of 65 was projected to 
exceed 90 percent. Between 1900 and 2000, 
the expected share of a newborn boy’s life that 
would be accounted for by years lived beyond 
the age of 65 rose from 12.2 percent to 22.0 per-
cent. For newborn girls, the change was from 
17.9 to 24.7 percent. The changes at even older 
ages have been more dramatic. In the 2000 birth 
cohort, males and females could expect to live 
4.3 and 6.1 percent of their lives, respectively, 
beyond age 85. The corresponding values for 
the 1900 birth cohort were 1.1 and 2.9 percent. 
Eggleston and Fuchs (2012) observe that pro-
spectively, most of the extension of life length is 
likely to be due to reductions in mortality rates 
at older ages, which implies continued growth in 
the population share accounted for by the “old-
est old.”
For an individual, holding constant the age-
wage profile and transfers received from previ-
ous generations and from the government, an 
increase in life expectancy will affect the optimal 
level and path of consumption, and  potentially 
the age profile of labor supply. Unless lifecycle 
labor supply rises or the individual receives 
larger transfers as a consequence of a longer life, 
a longer lifespan will translate into a lower level 
of annual consumption. This will entail both a 
higher saving rate when working, and a lower 
rate of annual consumption when not.
Shoven and Slavov (2013) point out that indi-
viduals should not plan based only on average 
life expectancy, but that they must also consider 
the upper tail of the distribution of life length—
a key insight of stochastic lifecycle models. 
Table 2 presents the age to which 20 percent 
of the men and women who reach age 65 can 
expect to live. For a man reaching the age of 65 
in 2015, remaining life expectancy is 18.6 years, 
but he has a 20 percent chance of living at least 
twenty-five years and dying beyond his nineti-
eth birthday. For women in this birth cohort, life 
expectancy at 65 is 20.3 years, but one in five 
will live to the age of 93. The expected age of 
death for the second-to-die in a married couple, 
both aged 65, is even greater. For both men and 
women, the increase in the age that 20 percent of 
those who reach age 65 can expect to reach has 
roughly kept pace with the increase in remaining 
life expectancy at age 65.
These statistics not only suggest that the rele-
vant planning horizon for many individuals may 
be substantially longer than average life expec-
tancy, but they also highlight the growing impor-
tance of saving and financial planning challenges 
at the oldest ages. Dementia and reduced cogni-
tive function can complicate financial planning 
for the oldest old. Agarwal et al. (2009) report 
that cognitive function and financial literacy 
decline once individuals pass their mid-50s. 
Because the number of “oldest old,” tradition-
ally defined as those older than 85, has histori-
cally been relatively small, these issues have not 
Table 1—Life Expectancy at Birth and Age 65, 1900–2000 Birth Cohorts
Birth cohort Men Women
Life 
expectancy
at birth
Probability
of reaching
age 65
Life 
expectancy 
at 65
Life 
expectancy
 at birth
Probability 
of reaching
age 65
Life 
expectancy 
at 65
1900 51.5 0.467 13.5 58.3 0.578 18.0
1950 72.5 0.759 17.6 78.5 0.847 20.3
2000 80.0 0.861 20.4 84.2 0.906 23.0
Source: Bell and Miller (2005, Table 7). Entries in columns 2, 4, 5, and 7 are measured in years.
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received much attention, but they are likely to 
become increasingly important.
Aggregate data on mortality improvement 
also conceal substantial differences in the rate of 
longevity improvement for individuals with dif-
ferent characteristics. The drop in old-age mor-
tality rates has been particularly pronounced for 
those in the upper strata of the socioeconomic 
status distribution. Table 3 presents estimates of 
life expectancy at ages 65 and 85 for US men in 
the upper and lower half of the earnings distri-
bution for birth cohorts between 1912 and 1941. 
Individuals are classified based on their Social 
Security earnings between ages 45 and 55. The 
sample excludes those without any earnings, so 
the lower half of the earnings distribution may 
exclude many of the individuals in the poorest 
health.
Table 3 illustrates the apparent widening of 
the “mortality gradient.” This gradient and the 
associated disparity in health status have been 
documented in Meara, Richards, and Cutler (2008) and Pijoan-Mas and Ríos-Rull (2013), 
among others. The gradient has a number 
of important implications for the analysis of 
retirement  security and for public policies. For 
 individuals in the upper strata of the socioeco-
nomic distribution, the relevant planning hori-
zon for retirement saving may be substantially 
longer than population-wide measures of life 
expectancy suggest. In addition, as Goldman 
and Orszag (2014) observe, estimates of the 
present discounted value of lifetime Social 
Security and Medicare benefits net of payroll 
taxes for individuals at different places in the 
income distribution are sensitive to assumptions 
about the mortality gradient. The sources of the 
mortality gradient are not well understood, and 
it may be affected by various societal changes. 
For example, Poterba, Venti, and Wise (forth-
coming) demonstrate that educational attain-
ment is strongly correlated with health status 
at retirement and with an individual’s position 
in the lifetime earnings distribution. This raises 
the possibility that a changing distribution of 
educational attainment and other factors across 
cohorts may affect the evolution of the mortality 
gradient.
In addition to their implications for individual 
retirement planning, longer life spans also have 
important consequences for government transfer 
programs. Because Social Security, Medicare, 
Table 2—Life Expectancy and the Probability of Living to Very Old Age 
Birth cohort Men Women
Expected age
at death 
conditional on 
reaching age 65 
Age at which only 
20% of those who 
reach age 65 
will still be alive 
Expected age 
at death 
conditional on 
reaching age 65 
Age at which only 
20% of those who 
reach age 65 will 
still be alive 
1900 78.5 86.2 83.0 91.5
1950 82.6 90.5 85.3 93.4
2000 85.4 93.6 88.0 96.3
Sources: Bell and Miller (2005, Table 7) for columns 2 and 4; author’s calculations, columns 3 
and 5.
Table 3—Life Expectancy for Men, Stratified by Lifetime Earnings,  
1912–1941 Birth Cohorts
Birth cohort Life expectancy at 65 Life expectancy at 85
Bottom half 
of earners 
Top half 
of earners
Bottom half 
of earners
Top half 
of earners
1912 14.8 15.5 6.2 5.9
1922 15.3 17.5 6.2 6.9
1932 15.7 19.6 6.2 8.0
1941 16.1 21.5 6.1 9.0
Source: Waldron (2007, Table 4). Entries are measured in years.
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and Medicaid provide much greater benefits to 
older than to younger individuals, and in the case 
of Medicare only provide benefits for those over 
the age of 65, an aging population will imply 
significant increases in public sector outlays on 
these programs. This increase in fiscal burdens 
is one of the key macroeconomic effects of an 
aging population. Modifications in eligibility 
rules and program benefits, the “entitlement 
reform” debate, may attenuate, but are unlikely 
to undo, these fiscal demands. The heterogeneity 
of the elderly population needs to be recognized 
in discussions of program reforms. Raising the 
age of eligibility for Medicare and the normal 
retirement age for Social Security, for example, 
would likely affect the labor supply of older 
individuals and it would affect individuals dif-
ferently depending on their health status and 
capacity to continue working at advanced ages.
Changes in government transfer programs are 
one way that a society may respond to an aging 
population. Raising transfers from younger to 
older individuals can support the consumption 
of the elderly. The burden of such a policy on 
the younger generation, relative to the benefit 
for a member of the older generation, depends 
on the relative size of the young and old cohorts, 
which in turn is determined by the rate of popu-
lation growth and, potentially, by the immigra-
tion rate. In economies with rapid population 
growth, the younger cohort is much larger than 
the older one and the required tax on the young 
to support the old is smaller than in an economy 
that has grown more slowly, and in which the 
relative sizes of the younger and older cohorts 
is closer to equality. This is one of the reasons 
why transfer programs targeted to the elderly 
were less burdensome on younger individuals 
when they were created in the last century, at a 
time of rapid population growth, than they will 
be prospectively.
A key issue that underpins analysis of propos-
als to raise program eligibility ages is whether 
longer life spans are associated with longer peri-
ods of disability, as might be the case if mod-
ern medical advances succeed in prolonging 
life for those in poor health, or longer periods 
of good health, as might be the case if changes 
in lifestyle or medical progress delay the onset 
of debilitating diseases. Recent studies support 
the second view: age-specific disability rates 
have fallen as life expectancy has risen. Cutler, 
Ghosh, and Landrum (forthcoming) estimate 
that disability-free life expectancy for a 65- year- 
old man was 9.2 years in 1992, while disabled 
life expectancy was 6.2 years. Between 1992 
and 2005, they estimate that disability-free life 
expectancy rose by 1.7 years, while disabled 
life expectancy fell by 0.4 years. Disability-free 
life expectancy rose by more than the increase 
in life expectancy, suggesting that the age of onset 
of major disabilities receded even more quickly 
than the advance in life expectancy would sug-
gest. For women, the pattern was even more pro-
nounced. Disability-free life expectancy in 1992 
was 8.4 years. It increased by 1.6 years by 2005, 
while disabled life expectancy, which was 9.4 
years in 1992, fell by 1.4 years. Heterogeneity is 
evident in the decline in disability rates, just as 
in mortality changes. For those in lower socio-
economic strata, the improvement in disability-
free life expectancy is substantially smaller than 
that for the population at large. Nevertheless, it 
appears that for a substantial part of the popula-
tion reaching the age of traditional retirement, 
health limitations do not preclude at least some 
additional years of work. The prospective labor 
supply decisions of individuals in their 60s and 
even 70s can have an important impact on both 
the fiscal and macroeconomic effects of an aging 
population.
II. Macroeconomic Implications  
of an Older Population
Falling age-specific mortality rates have 
important implications for individual lifecycle 
planning, but they also affect the aggregate 
population age distribution and can therefore 
have macroeconomic consequences. Birth rates, 
immigration rates, and death rates all combine 
to determine the population age structure. In the 
United States, recent improvements in longevity 
have coincided with falling birth rates. Mather (2012) reports that the average number of chil-
dren born to a US woman over her  lifetime 
declined from 3.5 during the late 1950s and 
early 1960s to less than 2.0 by the mid-1970s, a 
value that has varied relatively little since then.
Table 4 reports the historical and projected 
share of the US population over the age of 65, 
over the age of 85, and under the age of 18 
between 1900 and 2050. Between 1950 and 
2000, the percentage of the US population over 
the age of 65 rose from roughly 8 to 12 per-
cent. It is projected to rise by an even larger 
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proportion, to 20.9 percent, by 2050. Between 
1950 and 2050, the share of the population over 
the age of 85 is expected to rise ten-fold. The 
 population share over 85 in 2050 will roughly 
equal the share over 65 in 1900.
The data in Table 4 can be used to compute 
an “elderly dependency ratio,” which equals the 
number of elderly individuals divided by the 
number of prime-age individuals. If we define 
this ratio as the number of those over the age of 
65 relative to those 19–64, the entries in Table 4 
imply a rising elderly dependency ratio, from 
0.20 in 2000, to 0.32 in 2025, to 0.36 in 2050. 
The “total dependency ratio,” which can be 
defined as (population under 18 + population 
over 65)/(population 19–64), rises less over the 
same period. It increases from 0.62 in 2000, to 
0.70 in 2025, to 0.74 in 2050.
The relative roles of family and government 
in caring for young and elderly dependents is 
different, so it remains an open question whether 
combining children and the elderly to construct 
a total dependency burden is appropriate. The 
dependency ratios reported here are illustrative, 
and similar concepts can be found in many other 
studies. Rogers, Toder, and Jones (2000) are one 
of many studies that explore the long-run effects 
of changing dependency burdens.
The potential macroeconomic consequences 
of the aging of the US population have been 
widely discussed. The National Research 
Council (2012) examines a number of the eco-
nomic effects that may be associated with popu-
lation aging, and also assesses the uncertainties 
associated with them. The foregoing discussion 
noted that an increase in the size of the public 
sector is one of the most predictable effects. To 
illustrate this, Table 5 reports measures of age-
specific consumption, labor income, and net 
government transfers from the National Transfer 
Accounts project, a multi-country study of the 
patterns of resource use and public and private 
transfers across generations. The data in Table 5 
correspond to the US economy in 2003. The rise 
in the relative price of medical care since then, 
and the greater share of such care in the budget 
of the elderly, suggests that the consumption of 
the elderly has probably risen, relative to that of 
other age groups, since this benchmark year.
The data in Table 5 indicate that aver-
age per capita consumption rises with age in 
 cross-sectional data. It “dips” between the ages of 
15–19 and 20–29, reflecting the decline of edu-
cational outlays, but rises again after age 30. The 
consumption level of those 85–89 in 2003 was 
roughly 50 percent greater than that of those in 
their early 30s. The differences in per capita con-
sumption by age suggest that changing age com-
position could affect the economy’s saving rate.
The labor income data in Table 5 display the 
expected pattern, peaking between the ages of 
45 and 54 and declining sharply between the late 
50s and early 70s. The table also shows that net 
public transfers play a critical role in supporting 
the consumption of older individuals. The aver-
age net government transfer to those between 
the ages of 70 and 74 was $11,409, roughly 
Table 4—Historical and Projected Age Structure of 
the US Population, 1900–2050
Year < 18 > 65 > 85
1900 40.8  4.1 0.2
1950 31.0  8.1 0.4
2000 25.7 12.4 1.5
2025 22.6 18.8 2.1
2050 21.5 20.9 4.2
Sources: Rows 1–3, Hobbs and Stoops (2002, Figures 2–7) 
and Day (1996, Table E); Rows 4 and 5, US Census Bureau, 
Population Division (2012, Table 3, Middle Series). All 
entries are percentage points.
Table 5—Average Consumption, Labor Income, and 
Net Government Transfers by Age, 2003 ($2003)
Age 
group Consumption
Labor 
income
Net 
government 
transfer 
0–4 $13,821 $0 $4,998
5–9 22,785 0 11,971
10–14 26,810 0 12,201
15–19 29,140 2,142 9,713
20–24 27,200 14,984 2,842
25–29 27,001 30,754 –3,294
30–34 30,205 40,388 –7,063
35–39 31,063 46,302 –9,887
40–44 31,750 49,875 –10,827
45–49 33,895 51,898 –12,012
50–54 36,559 51,136 –12,340
55–59 39,694 45,256 –10,628
60–64 41,455 30,251 –3,331
65–69 41,447 14,837 8,203
70–74 42,558 7,466 11,409
75–79 42,276 3,807 13,775
80–84 42,496 2,046 16,588
85–89 46,407 1,215 23,391
Source: Data provided by Gretchen Donehower based on 
Lee, Donehower, and Miller (2011).
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comparable to the average annual transfer to 
school-age children between the ages of 5 and 
15. Beyond age 75, however, net transfers con-
tinue to rise. For someone between the ages of 85 
and 89, the average annual net transfer, $23,391, 
is more than double that for a 70–74-year-old. 
The young benefit primarily from spending on 
public education and child-targeted antipoverty 
programs such as Medicaid and SNAP. For the 
elderly, the key transfer programs are Social 
Security, Medicare, and Medicaid.
The age-specific transfer patterns in Table 5 
are broadly consistent with recent estimates by 
the Congressional Budget Office (2013) that 
are benchmarked to 2006. The CBO estimates 
that net transfers, defined as federal government 
transfers minus taxes, to households headed by 
someone over the age of 65 averaged $13,900, 
while the corresponding transfers for non-
elderly households with and without children 
were −$16,900 and −$15,800 respectively. 
The CBO (2013) also reports that in 2006, the 
15 percent of households aged 65+ received 
over 60 percent of federal transfers.
Under the strong assumption that relative age-
specific income and spending patterns remain 
constant over time, the data in Table 5 can be 
combined with information on the historical 
and projected population in different age groups 
to calculate how changes in population struc-
ture could affect per capita consumption and 
labor earnings. Sheiner (2014) presents a more 
detailed summary of the potential effects of pro-
spective changes in population age structure on 
per capita consumption.
Projected per capita consumption in year 
t,  C t * , equals
(1)  C t * =  ∑ 
i
 
 
Pop i,t ×  C i,2003 .
Pop i,t is the projected (or historical) share of the 
population in age group i in year t, and  C i,2003 
is per capita consumption for age group i as 
reported in Table 5. A similar calculation yields 
projected per capita labor income,  L t * , based on 
the current pattern of earnings by age.
(2)  L t * =  ∑ 
i
 
 
Pop i,t ×  L i,2003 .
The ratio of  L t * / C t * for different years provides 
information on how per capita labor earnings 
will evolve relative to “notional” per capita con-
sumption as a result of the changing  population 
age distribution. Using the 2010 age distribu-
tion as a benchmark, labor earnings relative to 
consumption decline by 10 percent by 2050: [ L 2050 * / C 2050 * ]/[ L 2010 * / C 2010 * ] = 0.90. Most of this 
decline occurs by 2030. By comparison, this 
ratio for 1990 equaled 1.05, reflecting the larger 
relative population in prime earning years than 
in 2010. In 1970, the burdens of educating the 
baby boomers brought this ratio well below one: [ L 1970 * / C 1970 * ]/[ L 2010 * / C 2010 * ] = 0.88.
The prospective decline in this ratio, like 
the rise in the elderly dependency ratio, sig-
nals the pressure that changing age structure 
will place on the level of per capita consump-
tion in the US economy. All else equal, between 
2010 and 2030, to sustain the level of per cap-
ita consumption at all ages in 2010, total con-
sumption would need to rise by 2.2 percent ( C 2030 * / C 2010 *  = 1.022). At the same time, per cap-
ita labor earnings are projected to fall by 7.8 per-
cent ( L 2030 * / L 2010 * = 0.928). If the age- specific 
level of earnings does not change, absent other 
sources of support for consumption, such as ris-
ing capital income, per capita consumption in 
2030 would need to fall relative to 2010.
There are many potential transition paths that 
an economy can follow when faced with a demo-
graphic transition that requires a reduction in 
steady-state consumption. The economy’s capi-
tal accumulation path determines which trajec-
tory it follows. McGrattan and Prescott (2013) 
recognize this point, and argue that pursuing tax 
policies that would encourage capital deepening 
could raise the productivity of future workers 
relative to that of today’s workers, thereby shift-
ing the path of future L* values and potentially 
avoiding the need to reduce per capita consump-
tion. Encouraging human capital investments 
could also raise age-specific average earnings. 
Late-life age-specific average earnings could 
also rise if the labor force participation rate for 
older workers increased.
Cutler et al. (1990) compute the consump-
tion trajectory that a social planner would 
choose if she were solving a textbook Ramsey 
optimal growth problem, subject to the chang-
ing support ratios associated with population 
aging. They point out that the optimal con-
sumption path in an economy that is growing 
older because of declining fertility may dif-
fer from that in one that grows older because 
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of  declining  mortality. When the population is 
aging because of  declining old-age mortality, 
and retirement dates are not increasing, then the 
rising dependent population results in lower per-
capita consumption. If the population is aging 
because the birth rate has fallen and the labor 
force is growing more slowly, however, then the 
economy benefits in the near term from a reduc-
tion in the level of investment that is needed to 
preserve the  capital-labor ratio. This frees up 
resources that can support consumption. Is this a 
relevant consideration today? The annual rate of 
growth of the US population aged 20–64 aver-
aged 1.27 percent between 1960 and 2010; it is 
projected to average only 0.43 percent between 
2010 and 2050. The positive consumption effect 
of this decline in labor force growth, however, 
is modest relative to negative effect of the fall-
ing labor force to population ratio and it attenu-
ates but does not reverse this effect. Twenty-five 
years ago, when Cutler et al. (1990) investigated 
this issue, the prospective decline in labor force 
growth effect was larger, and the negative pres-
sure from rising dependency ratios was smaller, 
than today. In some cases then, the Ramsey 
social planner’s response to incipient popula-
tion aging involved raising, then reducing, per 
capita consumption. That is no longer the case 
for plausible parameter choices.
The net transfer patterns by age group that 
are shown in Table 5 suggest that the changing 
population age structure between 2010 and 2050 
will place substantial demands on the public 
sector. This fiscal consequences are discussed 
in National Research Council (2010). The data 
on net government transfers in Table 5, com-
bined with population projections for various 
years, suggest that population aging could raise 
the age-weighted net per capita transfer, which 
is $−279 in 2010, to $893 by 2030 and $1,023 
by 2050. Note that the information in Table 5 
predates the expansion of various transfer pro-
grams in connection with the Great Recession; 
these program changes may have affected the 
age-specific patterns of taxes and spending to 
some degree.
The fiscal effects of population aging have 
attracted substantial attention, but there are at 
least two other potential macroeconomic con-
sequences that could have first-order effects on 
future living standards: changes in equilibrium 
rates of return in capital markets, and effects 
on the rate of technological progress. Although 
different, both effects can compound over 
time. For example, the potential decline of 10 
 percent between 2010 and 2030 in the ratio of 
per capita labor earnings to per capita consump-
tion “needs” would be completely erased if the 
rate of productivity growth increased by 0.5 per-
centage points per year, and that productivity 
advance translated into growth in labor earnings.
When analyzing the potential effects of popu-
lation aging on rates of return, it is important 
to recognize that in integrated global capital 
markets, the age structure of the global popu-
lation can be at least as important an influence 
on equilibrium rates of return as the domestic 
age structure, and perhaps much more impor-
tant. For assets that are traded in fully integrated 
global capital markets, the domestic age struc-
ture should not matter; the global age structure, 
and the associated global capital-labor ratio, 
should be the key determinant of rates of return. 
Although the US population grows older in 
the next four decades, the rate at which the US 
ages is slower than that of many other nations, 
including most of Western Europe and China. 
Falling birth rates in both locations lead to sharp 
changes in prospective population age structure. 
In calibrated multi-country models of global 
capital accumulation that recognize the shift-
ing global age structure, such as Börsch-Supan, 
Ludwig, and Winter (2006), the equilibrium rate 
of return declines as a result of the rising global 
ratio of capital to labor, but the effect is less than 
1 percentage point per year. In some modeling 
scenarios with fully integrated global capital 
markets, the effect is substantially smaller. One 
scenario that yields much smaller effects on 
returns allows for rising per capita labor supply 
as the population ages. This is just one of the 
economic adjustments that are likely to limit the 
magnitude of any decline in equilibrium returns.
A number of empirical studies have explored 
the relationship between a nation’s population 
age structure and its capital market returns, with 
mixed results. Arnott and Chaves (2012), who 
study a broad cross-section of countries, and Liu 
and Spiegel (2011), who study the US historical 
record, among others, find a positive correlation 
between population age structure, particularly 
the fraction of the population of prime work-
ing age, and returns. Arnott and Chaves focus 
on equity market returns, and they suggest that 
investors should prepare for a long prospective 
period during which returns will fall below their 
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historical averages. Other studies, however, find 
weaker links between demography and returns, 
and point out that the effective “degrees of free-
dom” in studies linking demography to rates of 
return can be quite small. Poterba (2001), for 
example, does not find any robust relationship 
between age structure and equity returns in the 
United States, United Kingdom, or Canada. 
The large fluctuations in equity values over the 
last six years are a reminder of the difficulty of 
detecting the modest differences in expected 
returns that might be associated with demo-
graphic forces.
One specific concern, raised more frequently 
in the financial press than in the research lit-
erature, is that there may be an asset market 
“meltdown” when the large cohort of US baby 
boomers reach retirement and begin to draw 
down their retirement savings, depressing asset 
prices. This scenario seems unlikely for two 
reasons. First, demographic changes are largely 
predictable, and predictable events generally do 
not have large effects on asset values. It would 
be difficult for the capital markets to be sur-
prised by the retirement of the baby boomers. 
Second, for those who have accumulated assets 
while working, the rate at which these assets 
are drawn down tends to be quite slow. The US 
Government Accountability Office (2006) con-
cludes that the draw-down of financial assets in 
retirement is likely to be gradual at best.
After reviewing the theoretical work, 
the calibrated modeling, and the empirical 
research on the links between demography and 
rates of return, the National Research Council (2012) report concludes that these effects are 
likely to be modest, particularly when viewed 
against the backdrop of equity market volatil-
ity. However, even modest effects on annual 
returns could cumulate to a substantial effect 
on wealth over a period of several decades. 
This point is emphasized later, in the discus-
sion of returns and the opportunity to build 
retirement wealth.
The second long-run macroeconomic effect, 
the possibility that a shifting population age 
structure may affect the rate of technological 
change, is also one that could cumulate over sev-
eral decades. As with rate of return effects, the 
global as well as domestic population age struc-
ture may matter for the production of new ideas 
and the advance of technology. The empirical 
evidence on this issue is limited, and does not 
reach a clear consensus. Some suggest that older 
workers are less productive, or that they are less 
flexible in adapting to new technologies than 
their younger counterparts. While many empiri-
cal studies have adopted a quadratic approach 
to modeling earnings as a function of age or 
labor market experience, and found an inverted-
U shaped age-earnings pattern, the empirical 
evidence on declining earnings at older ages is 
limited. Although Johnson and Neumark (1996) 
report falling wages as workers approach retire-
ment age, a number of other studies, includ-
ing Murphy and Welch (1990) and Casanova (2013), find that age-earnings profiles plateau, 
but do not decline.
This finding is supported by a growing lit-
erature on age-productivity relationships that 
relies on firm-level microdata. Börsch-Supan 
and Weiss (2013), for example, find no increase 
in the rate of errors in a Mercedes-Benz factory 
as workers age. While the standard errors on the 
estimated error rates are higher for workers over 
the age of 65 and under the age of 25, there is 
statistically significant evidence of higher error 
rates for workers under the age of 30, but no evi-
dence of higher error rates as workers age into 
their 60s. Bloom and Sousa-Poza (2013) and 
Börsch-Supan (2013) present summaries of the 
age-productivity literature; neither finds com-
pelling evidence that older workers are less pro-
ductive. While there may be some occupations, 
for example those that demand heavy physical 
labor, in which older workers are not as produc-
tive as their younger counterparts, these stud-
ies suggest that this pattern is difficult to detect 
more broadly.
Another concern, and one that appears to 
have more empirical support, is that an aging 
population will reduce the level of entrepre-
neurial or innovative activity. Liang, Wang, and 
Lazear (2013) study the relationship between a 
nation’s entrepreneurship rates as measured by 
the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor and the 
fraction of its population aged 20 to 64 that is 
between the ages of 20 and 39. A 1 percentage 
point increase in the share of the working age 
population in their 20s and 30s is associated 
with a 5 percent increase in the entrepreneur-
ship rate. The mean entrepreneurship rate in 
their 59-country sample is 9.5 percent, so at the 
mean, a 5 percentage point drop in the share of 
20–39-year-olds would reduce the entrepreneur-
ship rate by more than 2 percentage points. In a 
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related vein, Jones, Reedy, and Weinberg (forth-
coming) study the relationship between age and 
major  scientific contributions. They find that 
while the age at which individuals make major 
breakthroughs varies across fields and has var-
ied over time, there is systematic evidence of a 
declining rate of such innovations after middle 
age. Whether the association between entrepre-
neurship, innovation, and population age struc-
ture is causal is an unresolved question, and 
how much a change in entrepreneurship affects 
the rate of technological change is also an open 
issue.
The National Research Council (2012) exam-
ined the relationship between population age 
structure, measured in ten-year age increments, 
and the rate of aggregate productivity growth 
across OECD countries. Productivity growth 
does appear to be related to age structure, with 
the fraction of workers close to age 40 having the 
most positive impact on productivity. This effect 
declines smoothly for both younger and older 
workers. The statistical relationship between 
the average age of the workforce and the rate 
of productivity growth is not robust, however; 
it is sensitive to minor changes in specification. 
For most specifications that were examined, the 
demography-related change in the productivity 
growth rate over the next two decades is less 
than one-tenth of 1 percent in absolute value, 
suggesting that this effect on future consump-
tion levels is small relative to the direct effects 
of rising dependency burdens.
III. The Heterogeneous Nature of Retirement 
Income Support
Retirement income support in the United 
States is often described as a “three-legged 
stool” consisting of government-provided 
Social Security, employer-based private pen-
sion plans, and private saving. Social Security 
is a component of retirement income for nearly 
all elderly households. It is also the subject of 
ongoing policy debate, with some calling for 
scaling back benefits, particularly for well-to-do 
elderly households, and others suggesting pro-
gram expansion to strengthen retirement secu-
rity for low-income elderly households. The 
second, income from employment-based pen-
sions, is relevant for about half of the elderly. 
This component of the retirement saving system 
has undergone substantial transformation in the 
last three decades, with a shift from defined 
benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) 
 pension plans in the private sector. This shift has 
replaced one set of risks, for example the risk of 
job loss before the late-career years when DB 
plans generate their largest retirement benefit 
accruals, with another set, including participant 
decision risk, financial market risk, and annuiti-
zation risk. The third component, private saving 
outside the retirement saving system, repre-
sents an important source of support for only 
a  fraction—perhaps one-quarter—of retired 
households, skewed toward the upper strata of 
the income distribution.
Retirement support arrangements of the 
elderly are heterogeneous. Only about one- 
quarter of the elderly population draws sub-
stantial support from all three legs of the “three 
legged stool.” A large and growing fraction of 
those over the age of 65, particularly those in 
the higher strata of the income distribution, rely 
on earnings for a share of their support. For 
many elderly individuals in the bottom half of 
the income distribution, Social Security benefits 
represent their primary source of support.
Table 6 reports data from the Current 
Population Survey on the sources of income 
for individuals over the age of 65 in 2013. 
Following Purcell (2009) and others, indi-
viduals are disaggregated into quartiles based 
on total income. The analysis focuses on 
individuals, rather than households, which 
requires allocating joint income in couples to 
one spouse or the other. It also may understate 
the effective living standard of the roughly 
11 percent of those over the age of 65 who 
are part of a household in which the house-
hold head is younger than 65. Some of these 
households are married couples, while others 
are  multi- generational households. Focusing 
on individuals helps shed light on the circum-
stances of elderly women, perhaps at some cost 
in the extent to which the data describe the 
circumstances of elderly men. Elderly women 
are less likely than elderly men to be part of a 
married couple. The US Census Bureau (2013) 
reports that 74.9 percent of men between the 
ages of 65 and 74 were in households that were 
“married, with spouse present.” Even for men 
over the age of 85, 51.3 percent were in mar-
ried households. For women, 55.3 percent of 
the 65–74-year-old cohort is married; only 16.1 
percent of those 85+ are in couples.
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Focusing on individuals may understate the 
effective living standard of a low-income indi-
vidual who is part of a married couple and whose 
spouse has substantial income, and it reduces the 
fraction of the respondents with any particular 
type of income relative to the analogous share of 
households. For example, in household data, if 
one spouse in a married couple receives income 
from an employer provided pension, the house-
hold will be classified as receiving such income. 
When the individual is the focus of the tabula-
tion, however, only one of the two individuals 
in the household will be classified as receiving 
such income.
The entries in Table 6 show that for individu-
als over the age of 65 and in the bottom half 
of the income distribution for this age group, 
about 84 percent of retirement support is from 
Social Security benefits. In the bottom quartile, 
only 73 percent of individuals report receiving 
Social Security. While this may reflect a lack of 
eligibility on the part of some, particularly older 
individuals, it may also reflect measurement 
error. Iams and Purcell (2013) explore under-
reporting of Social Security income by match-
ing household survey data with administrative 
record data. They find that 7 percent of CPS 
respondents with Social Security benefit pay-
ments in the Payment History Update System 
fail to report any such income in the survey. 
Under-reporting may be more prevalent among 
those with lower incomes.
The importance of Social Security as a source 
of retirement income for those in the bottom half 
of the income distribution reflects both the low 
saving rate for many workers and the progres-
sivity of the Social Security benefit formula. The 
ratio of annual Social Security benefits to career 
average earnings, a measure of the “replacement 
rate,” is higher for those with lower earnings. 
Table 7 reports estimates of this replacement 
rate for individuals at various points in the wage 
distribution. For an individual at the twenty-fifth 
percentile of the wage distribution, the replace-
ment rate is more than 75 percent. Mitchell and 
Phillips (2006) perform calculations related to 
those in Table 7, and suggest that replacement 
rates computed using actual rather than styl-
ized wage profiles are likely to exceed those in 
Table 7. The high replacement rates from Social 
Security alone are essential to remember when 
considering issues such as the incomplete cov-
erage of private pensions, since they attenuate 
the need for additional income for a subset of 
elderly individuals.
The entries in Table 6 also show that pension 
income is far from a universal source of retire-
ment income support. Only about 12 percent of 
those in the lower half of the income distribution 
report receiving private pension income. The 
CPS coverage of income paid out from defined 
contribution pension plans is not as detailed 
as that in some other surveys, so the entries in 
Table 6—Income Sources for Individuals Aged 65+, 2013, by Total Income Quartile
Percentage receiving income type Percentage of total income
Quartile: Lowest Second Third Highest Lowest Second Third Highest
Social Security 73.3 94.6 90.1 78.1 85.0 83.5 56.5 18.1
Earnings 4.3 8.2 22.6 51.3 2.3 4.2 12.9 43.7
Pension income 5.4 19.8 52.3 56.2 2.5 6.2 21.1 21.8
Asset income 26.4 40.1 57.0 74.8 2.7 3.7 6.8 13.8
SSI/Public Assistance 8.0 2.2 0.7 0.4 6.6 1.0 0.2 0.0
Other income 2.5 5.0 8.4 12.6 1.0 1.5 2.6 2.6
Mean individual income $6,756 $15,401 $26,640 $78,180 $6,756 $15,401 $26,640 $78,180
Source: Author’s calculations using March 2013 Current Population Survey data described by King, et al. (2013). 
Table 7—Social Security Earnings Replacement 
Rates, 2013
Career average earnings 
as a percentage of 
national average wage
Career average 
earnings 
level
Replacement 
rate, retirement
at age 65
25 percent $11,207 77.4
45 percent $20,172 56.3
100 percent $44,826 41.7
160 percent $71,722 34.6
Social Security
 earnings limit
$113,700 27.9
Source: Board of Trustees, Federal OASDI and Federal DI 
Trust Funds (2013, Table V.C.7). Entries in last column are 
percentage points.
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the right-hand panel on the share of income 
from pensions should be viewed with caution. 
Anguelov, Iams, and Purcell (2012) in particular 
raise concerns about the under-reporting of pay-
outs from defined contribution pension plans. 
Individuals with assets in such plans, but who 
are not taking withdrawals in a given year, will 
not report any pension income. For those below 
the age of 701/2, the age at which required mini-
mum distributions from such plans begin, this 
could represent a large fraction of the account 
holders.
These concerns notwithstanding, for those 
in the top two quartiles of the income distribu-
tion pension income appears to be a substantial 
source of retirement support. It accounts for 
about one-fifth of total income. About half of the 
individuals in this group report receiving pen-
sion income. For those in the quartile just above 
the median, Social Security benefits account for 
more than half of their income. Asset income of 
all kinds represents less than 7 percent of total 
income. This does not imply that households 
have little financial wealth, since some might 
have assets such as bank deposits that yield 
very little income. The principal associated with 
these investments could nevertheless be used 
to support retirement spending. Resolving this 
issue requires balance sheet data.
The last column in Table 6 indicates that 
elderly individuals in the top quartile of the 
income distribution draw income from a range 
of sources, including all three components of 
the “three-legged stool” as well as earnings. 
Social Security benefits and pension income 
each account for about one-fifth of the income 
of these individuals, while income from assets 
accounts for a bit less—about one-sixth. Half 
of those in the top quartile report some earned 
income, and earnings account for more than 
40 percent of the income for this group. The 
table shows a stark contrast between individuals 
in the top quartile of the distribution, and those 
below median income. Social Security is the 
predominant source of income for those in the 
lower two quartiles, which underscores the criti-
cal role of changes in Social Security benefits 
in affecting the well-being of these individuals.
Table 6 does not provide any information on 
age-related differences in the relative impor-
tance of various income streams, but they are 
substantial. The importance of earnings declines 
with increasing age. Roughly 37 percent of the 
“youngest elderly,” those between the ages of 65 
and 69, report some earnings. This declines to 
21 percent for the 70–74 age group, and to only 
7 percent for those over the age of 80. At all ages, 
individuals who are still working are dispropor-
tionately likely to be in the upper income strata. 
For the 75+ group, for example, 27 percent of 
those in the top quartile report earned income, 
and income from earnings accounts for 24 per-
cent of their total income. Only 9.7 percent of 
the 75+ group reported any earned income, so 
more than 60 percent of those with earnings 
were in the top income quartile.
Younger and married elderly individuals 
are more likely to be in the top quartile of the 
income distribution for all elderly individuals. In 
2013, 34 percent of individuals aged 65–69 were 
in the top quartile of the income distribution for 
all 65+ individuals, compared with only 16.1 
percent of those over the age of 80. The oldest 
old are often in different financial circumstances 
than their younger counterparts, and they are 
more likely to depend on Social Security as 
their primary income source. Women account 
for 77 percent of the individuals in the lowest 
income quintile, and they are disproportionately 
the “oldest old.”
The importance of earnings as a source of 
income for the elderly has changed substantially 
in the last four decades. Table 8 shows labor 
force participation rates for various sub-groups 
of the elderly since 1970. The data show that 
the labor force participation rate for men aged 
65–69 and 70+ declined in the 1970s and 1980s, 
but has rebounded since then. The 2010 value is 
more than 1.5 times the postwar low for this par-
ticipation rate for men, which occurred in 1985 (24.4 percent). The labor force participation rate 
for women over the age of 65 is higher today 
Table 8—Labor Force Participation Rates ( percent) for 
Individuals Over the Age of 65, 1970–2010
Year Men Women
65–69 70+ 65–69 70+
1970 41.6 17.6 17.3 5.7
1980 28.5 13.1 15.1 4.5
1990 26.0 10.7 17.0 4.7
2000 30.3 12.0 19.5 5.8
2010 36.5 14.7 27.0 8.3
Source: Federal Interagency Forum on Aging-Related 
Statistics (2012, Table 11).
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than in past decades, reflecting in part the  rising 
labor force participation rate at younger ages 
and the persistence of labor market activity over 
the life course. Ghilarducci (2008) observes that 
in the last two decades, the rise in labor force 
participation rates at older ages has roughly kept 
pace with rising longevity, and that the rapid 
growth rate in the expected number of late-life 
years out of the labor force has ended. On aver-
age, someone who turned 65 in the 1970s would 
have many more years of retirement than some-
one born 30 years earlier, that is not the case for 
someone turning 65 in 2014.
It is difficult to determine whether the ris-
ing labor force participation rate at older ages 
reflects increased notional supply of labor at 
older ages holding financial status constant, for 
example as a result of falling disability rates, or 
a reaction to changes in the level and structure of 
retirement income support, such as changes in 
the pension system or adverse financial shocks. 
It is most likely a combination, with some 
elderly individuals pushed to work longer by 
financial circumstances, while others choose to 
work longer because of the rising age of onset of 
activity-restricting disabilities. Survey evidence 
seems to support such a mixture. Helman et al. (2013) report that in the 2010 EBRI Retirement 
Confidence Survey, most “retirees” who were 
working for pay reported at least one positive 
reason for doing so, such as enjoying working (86 percent) and wanting to stay active (92 per-
cent). The same survey, however, also found that 
90 percent of this group indicated that at least 
one financial reason contributed to their contin-
ued working.
Despite substantial changes in the private pen-
sion system in the last three decades, the share 
of the elderly reporting some pension income 
changed very little between 1988 (35 percent) 
and 2013 (33 percent). The most substantial 
change over this period was the growth in the 
importance of earnings for individuals in the 
upper half of the income distribution; the rela-
tive importance of other income sources for 
elderly individuals has been relatively stable 
over time. In 1988, the first year when the March 
CPS could be used to make tabulations that are 
directly comparable to those for 2013, only 
11.5 percent of the over-65 individuals in the 
top quartile of the income distribution reported 
any earnings. In 2013, the analogous value was 
51.3 percent. Between 1988 and 2013, there was 
a modest decrease in the fraction of those over 
65 reporting asset income: from 69 to 50 per-
cent. One potential explanation of this shift is 
the rise of IRAs and 401(k)-type plans. The 
income earned on assets held in these accounts 
would be reported today as pension income. 
Before the rise of these accounts, the interest, 
dividends, and capital gains on retirement sav-
ing would have been reported as asset income.
IV. From Income to Wealth: Household Balance 
Sheets of the Elderly
Data on the sources of income for elderly 
individuals provides an important perspective 
on retirement security, but they do not reflect 
the depth of resources that these individuals 
might draw on in the event of financial need. For 
that purpose, it is necessary to consider balance 
sheet data. Since many assets are held jointly in 
married couples, it is also more natural to focus 
on households rather than individuals when con-
sidering balance sheet information.
Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2011a, 2013), 
show the distribution of wealth holdings for 
households aged 65–69 in the 2008 wave of 
the Health and Retirement Study. Table 9 sum-
marizes this information. Most of the surveys 
were conducted before June 2008, so they can 
be thought of as pre-financial crisis. The data 
underlying Table 9 do not reflect the sharp 
decline in equity values that took place in late 
2008 and early 2009; they reflect some of the 
decline in house prices that began in 2006 and 
2007. The entries in each column are based on 
distributions constructed for the wealth compo-
nent in that column. Thus the net worth of the 
household with the median value of net worth 
is $548,200. When households are ranked by 
total financial assets held outside retirement 
accounts such as 401(k)s and IRAs—an asset 
category with many low values—the median 
household has just $15,000. This value is larger, 
$27,800, for married households, but the table 
makes clear that financial assets for at least half 
of the distribution are modest and that the most 
important components of the balance sheet for 
those in the bottom half, and perhaps the bottom 
two-thirds of the distribution, are the present 
discounted value of their Social Security wealth 
and their home equity. Because the table reports 
 quantiles, and  households are ranked separately 
for each column, it is not  possible to add across 
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the rows. Thus, while the household at the tenth 
percentile of the distribution of each distinct 
asset class may report zero holdings, the house-
hold in the tenth percentile when all the wealth 
components are aggregated can report a positive 
value.
The virtual absence of financial wealth and 
DB pension wealth for roughly half of the 
“young elderly” households in Table 9 is con-
sistent with the information on income flows in 
Table 6, and in particular the central importance 
of Social Security income in the bottom half of 
the income distribution. The balance sheet data 
suggest that in addition to having low incomes, 
these households have very limited financial 
resources with which to absorb financial shocks. 
This situation, not surprisingly, persists at older 
ages, even though the households who live the 
longest are disproportionately drawn from the 
upper tier of the income and wealth distribu-
tions. Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2012) analyze 
wealth holdings in the last AHEAD survey that 
respondents completed before their death, which 
on average was carried out about one year before 
death. Among those who were single when they 
entered the survey in the mid-1990s, 57 percent 
had less than $10,000 in combined retirement 
accounts and other financial assets when last 
surveyed. For those who were married when 
first surveyed, and who were the second-to-die 
in their couple, it was 46 percent. Even for those 
who were the first to die, the group that on aver-
age is best prepared for retirement, 32 percent 
had less than $10,000. Fifty-two percent of this 
group had less than $50,000.
Housing equity is a key component of the net 
worth of elderly households, and it is distributed 
more equally than many other assets. The role 
of housing equity in supporting retirement well-
being has been an active subject of research, and 
tapping housing equity is a potentially important 
source of precautionary wealth for the elderly. 
Venti and Wise (2004) describe housing equity 
dynamics among elderly households. They find 
that most households do not draw down their 
housing equity, especially in their early retire-
ment years. In a sample period that was char-
acterized by generally rising house prices, they 
document a pattern of rising home equity for 
most households below the age of 75. They fur-
thermore find that most declines in home equity 
are associated with shocks, such as the death 
of a spouse in a married couple, or a major ill-
ness. The decline in the average level of housing 
equity among households at older ages is pri-
marily the result of large reductions for a small 
group of households.
Determining whether housing equity is 
comparable to other elements of the house-
hold balance sheet, because it can be drawn 
down in a financial emergency, is an important 
but still unresolved question. It is important 
for assessing retirement preparation. Scholz, 
Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006) find that the 
fraction of households approaching retirement 
who have accumulated the level of assets that 
Table 9—Distribution of Wealth Holdings ($000s) for Households Aged 65–69, 2008
Percentile Net worth
Social 
Security
Defined 
benefit 
pension 
wealth
Total non-
annuitized 
wealth
Financial 
assets outside
retirement 
accounts
Personal 
retirement 
account 
assets
Housing 
and other 
real estate
Panel A. All households
10 $127.3 $0.0 $0.0 $0.1 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0
30 289.3 126.8 0.0 71.8 2.0 0.0 42.0
50 548.2 187.4 0.0 221.7 15.0 5.0 120.0
70 911.9 227.8 83.0 518.0 70.0 75.0 229.5
90 1,826.4 384.8 329.6 1,274.0 358.0 347.0 585.0
Panel B. Married households
10 240.9 0.0 0.0 24.7 0.0 0.0 12.0
30 509.2 195.3 0.0 158.0 6.0 0.0 90.0
50 769.1 284.0 0.0 357.0 27.8 35.0 170.0
70 1,234.1 342.6 116.1 755.7 107.0 137.0 300.0
90 2,224.2 425.2 440.4 1,677.8 459.2 464.0 725.0
Source: Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2013).
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would be implied by the solution to a stochastic 
dynamic lifecycle model depends on whether 
 housing equity is or is not included in the life-
cycle wealth aggregate. Purcell (2012) illus-
trates this point in his report of post-retirement 
income replacement rates in the Health and 
Retirement Study. For the initial cohort of HRS 
respondents who worked for at least three sur-
vey waves, he finds a median (twenty-fifth per-
centile) replacement rate of 0.73 (0.48) based 
only on household income. When he includes 
the annuitized value of non-housing assets, 
these values rise to 0.90 and 0.61, respectively. 
Adding the annuity value of housing equity 
increases these values further, to 1.0 and 0.68. 
Thus considering the annuity value of hous-
ing is important even in the lower strata of the 
retiree wealth distribution.
These studies are part of a large literature that 
attempts to judge the adequacy of retirement 
saving. Hurd and Rohwedder (2012), one of the 
most systematic recent studies of retirement sav-
ing adequacy, find that 71 percent of those aged 
66–69 have resources that provide a 95 percent 
chance of dying with positive wealth. Munnell, 
Webb, and Golub-Sass (2012), who report on 
the “National Retirement Readiness Index,” find 
a lower fraction well-prepared when they con-
sider a broader, and younger, age group. While 
various studies employ different methodologies 
to assess retirement income preparedness, the 
finding that a significant group of households 
is not saving enough for retirement emerges in 
many studies.
How to construct a target replacement rate for 
pre-retirement income, and how it might vary 
across different strata of the income distribution, 
is an open research issue. Brady (2010) provides 
a survey of a number of the key measurement 
issues that arise in computing replacement rates. 
These include determining how consumption 
needs change at retirement as a result of dif-
ferential work-related expenses, recognizing 
the value of government-provided retiree health 
insurance (Medicare), and handling the poten-
tially important role of changes in consumption 
needs over the life course that are associated 
with raising children. The balance sheet data in 
Table 9, for example, does not include the pres-
ent discounted value of Medicare and Medicaid 
benefits. The income tabulations reported earlier 
similarly exclude any income-equivalent value 
for these benefits.
Some studies have compared consumption 
outlays before and after retirement as a way of 
trying to identify households that, as a result 
of a drop in consumption, were worse off after 
retirement. Hurd and Rohwedder (2013) present 
a recent summary of the changes in consump-
tion spending that occur at retirement. As in so 
many other aspects of retirement security, they 
find substantial heterogeneity. In the low-wealth 
population they find evidence of a post-retire-
ment decline in consumption, on average, partic-
ularly for those who retire earlier than expected 
and as a result of health limitations. This drop 
in consumption may signal under-saving among 
this group. For some higher wealth households 
they find increases in consumption outlays.
Finding that some households have virtually 
no financial wealth as they approach retirement 
has often been interpreted as a challenge to the 
stochastic lifecycle hypothesis, and as a call for 
further study of the appropriate framework for 
analyzing saving decisions. The presence of 
post-retirement transfer income and insurance 
programs such as Medicare and Medicaid may 
substantially reduce the need for private saving. 
De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010) model the 
stochastic properties of late-life medical expen-
ditures and analyze optimal saving behavior in 
the presence of such expenses. They conclude 
that precautionary saving against out-of-pocket 
medical costs is a potentially critical driver of 
saving among higher-income households, while 
the presence of Medicaid for lower-income 
elderly can account for much lower stocks of 
financial assets among this group.
Late-life medical expenditures, in particular 
the possibility of out-of-pocket spending for 
higher income households, may help to explain 
another empirical regularity which seems to 
challenge the lifecycle model. This is the slow 
rate of draw-down of retirement wealth among 
those who accumulate it. Poterba, Venti, and 
Wise (2011b) report that for the median elderly 
household that does not experience a family 
status shock, such as the loss of a spouse in a 
married couple, net worth is stable or rising 
between the ages of 65 and 80. Spending on 
medical care appears to be an important fac-
tor associated with the draw-down of retire-
ment saving. Smith (1999) summarizes a large 
 literature on the interplay between health status 
and economic circumstances for older house-
holds, and Coile and Milligan (2009) provide 
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evidence from the Health and Retirement Study 
suggesting that health shocks are associated 
with declines in asset holdings. Health needs 
are a particularly important source of end-of-life 
spending, which is why they figure prominently 
in many discussions of precautionary saving. 
Marshall, McGarry, and Skinner (2011) present 
information on out-of-pocket medical spending 
in only the last year of life. While the mean is 
modest, $11,618, the ninetieth percentile value 
is $49,907, and the ninety-ninth percentile is 
$94,310. The interplay between uninsured late-
life expenditures, of which medical costs not 
covered by Medicare or Medicaid probably 
loom largest for many households, and the tra-
jectory of wealth in retirement is one of the most 
active research topics in the field of retirement 
saving.
V. The Evolution of Employment-Related 
Retirement Saving Vehicles
The data on retirement income and balance 
sheets for the elderly show that particularly for 
those in the upper half of the income and wealth 
distribution, saving through employment-related 
saving vehicles provides an important source of 
retirement income and the accumulation in these 
vehicles represent a substantial share of wealth. 
The US income tax system allows deferral of 
income earned in various retirement saving 
accounts, lowering the tax burden on assets held 
in these accounts relative to those held in other 
ways. The structure of employment-related sav-
ing has shifted substantially in the last three 
decades, with defined contribution plans grow-
ing in importance and individuals bearing a 
larger share of the responsibility for determining 
their retirement security.
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and 
employer sponsored pension plans are two ways 
for individuals to save for retirement while 
receiving “consumption tax treatment” of their 
saving. This means that the interest, dividends, 
and capital gains on their accumulation in these 
accounts is not taxed on accrual, but upon with-
drawal. This contrasts with “income tax treat-
ment” which would tax these flows on accrual.
Individuals can open “traditional” IRAs, as 
well as their “Roth IRA” counterparts, at vari-
ous financial institutions, and they may contrib-
ute to them provided they have earned income. 
The contribution limit in 2014 for an IRA 
is $5,500 ($6,500 for those over 50) or total 
earnings, whichever is less. In a “traditional” 
IRA, the contribution to the account may be 
deducted from current taxable income, and the 
withdrawal is taxable as ordinary income. This 
means that one dollar invested today will yield (1 + r)T × (1 − τT), where τT is the individual’s 
tax rate at the time of withdrawal. For “Roth” 
IRAs, contributions are made net of tax, so if 
an individual devotes one dollar of earnings to 
a Roth IRA, the amount available after T years 
is (1 + r)T × (1 − τ0), where τ0 is the individ-
ual’s marginal tax rate at the time of contribu-
tion. Because the dollar limits for traditional and 
Roth IRAs are the same, but Roth contributions 
are net of tax, the amount of retirement income 
that can be purchased by the contribution of an 
amount, say $1,000, to a Roth IRA is greater 
than the amount of retirement income that can 
be purchased with an equivalent contribution 
to a traditional IRA. The individual’s current 
income taxes would be higher, however, if the 
contribution were devoted to a Roth IRA, so the 
effective current cost of the Roth contribution 
is greater. IRAs can also receive contributions 
when individuals choose to withdraw assets 
from other pension plans, and in recent years 
such “rollover” contributions have been sub-
stantially larger than contributions from earned 
income.
Employer sponsored retirement plans include 
both defined benefit (DB) and defined contri-
bution (DC) plans. DB plans, which expanded 
sharply in the United States after World War 
II, provide an annuitized stream of benefits 
once the individual reaches retirement age. 
They typically specify benefits as a function of 
past earnings, and in some cases they require 
employee contributions in addition to employer 
contributions. DB plans usually permit lump 
sum payouts when the employee changes jobs 
and at retirement. DC plans, of which 401(k) 
plans and 403(b) plans are the most common, 
allow individuals to contribute a fraction of 
their salary, often with an employer match, to 
an account that accumulates without any tax on 
investment returns until the time of withdrawal. 
Annual contributions to these plans are limited 
to $17,500 in 2014, with a “catch up contribu-
tion” of an additional $5,500 for those over 50. 
Individuals fortunate enough to be able to con-
tribute the upper limit amounts to these plans 
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over prolonged periods can accumulate substan-
tial amounts of retirement wealth.
In the past three decades, virtually no pri-
vate employers have introduced new DB 
plans, and many employers with existing plans 
have capped or closed them. The DC pen-
sion structure has been criticized, for example 
by Ghilarducci (2008), for eroding retirement 
security. How can this charge be squared with 
the observation by Brady, Burham, and Holden (2012) that many DC plan participants have 
accumulated substantial balances, or the report 
by Holden et al. (2013) that the total value of 
assets held in 401(k) plans reached $4 trillion 
in the third quarter of 2013? The answer, evi-
dent from the foregoing table, is heterogeneity. 
There are many individuals of working age who 
are not participating in these programs or saving 
enough in them to provide significant retirement 
support, but there are also some who are accu-
mulating substantial balances that will help sup-
port post-retirement consumption.
To illustrate the changing nature of these 
programs, Table 10 presents information from 
Department of Labor surveys in 1985, 1990, and 
2010 on pension coverage among different types 
of employers. In 1990, 59 percent of the employ-
ees at large and medium private establishments 
were covered by DB plans. In 2010, only 30 per-
cent were. The US Department of Labor (2001) 
estimates that in 1979, 10 percent of private 
sector wage and salary workers were covered 
by a DB and a DC plan, while another 28 per-
cent had only a DB plan and 7 percent had only 
DC plan coverage. These statistics yield a total 
of 45 percent with pension coverage of some 
type. By 1998, 15 percent had both DB and DC, 
7 percent had only a DB, while the percentage 
with only a DC had increased to 27 percent. A 
total of 49 percent of workers had pension cov-
erage of some type. Recent tabulations by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2013) based on the 
March 2013 National Compensation Survey sug-
gest that 49 percent of private sector workers have 
some form of pension coverage, with 9 percent 
covered by both DB and DC, another 7 percent 
by just DB, and 33 percent by just DC. The data 
on DB plans may overstate the extent to which 
workers are currently accruing DB plan benefits, 
since 26 percent of private sector workers who 
participate in DB plans are in “frozen” plans that 
no longer accrue benefits for participants and 
no longer accept new members. To understand 
the implications of these statistics for retirement 
income support, it is important, as some of the 
foregoing studies of replacement rates do, to 
examine whether those without employer pen-
sion coverage have substantial replacement rates 
from other sources, such as Social Security.
Table 10 also shows that the dramatic shift in 
private sector pension plans has not been mir-
rored in public sector plans. In 1990, 90 per-
cent of state and local government employees 
were estimated to participate in a DB plan; in 
2010 that number was 87 percent. Munnell, 
Haverstick, and Soto (2007) offer a number of 
potential explanations for the relative persis-
tence of DB plans in the public but not the pri-
vate sector, including differential sensitivity of 
taxpayers and stock market investors to the cost 
and volatility of these plans.
To place the pension coverage data in Table 10 
in context, recall the foregoing discussion of the 
changes over time in the fraction of individuals 
over the age of 65 who report receiving pension 
income. Even when the penetration of DB plans 
was close to its peak, in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, only about 50 percent of private sector 
workers participated in pension plans. The shift 
from DB to DC plans in the private sector has 
not had dramatic effects on the extent of pen-
sion plan participation, but it has changed the 
Table 10—The Changing Composition of Retirement Saving Plans, 1985–2010
Any plan DB plan DC plan
1990 (1985) 2010 1990 (1985) 2010 1990 (1985) 2010
Medium and large private establishments 78 (91) 66 59 (80) 30 48 (41) 54
Small private establishments 42 35 20  9 31 31
State and local governments 96 94 90 87  9 19
Source: EBRI (2013, Chapters 4 and 10). The 1990 data for medium and large private establishments corresponds to the 1991 
survey of this group. Entries indicate the percent of workers covered by each type of retirement plan.
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set of retirement-related risks facing individuals. 
In a DB plan, the greatest risks are that work-
ers will separate from their employer before 
they reach the late-career stage at which pen-
sion wealth accumulates most rapidly. In a DC 
plan, eligible employees must make many deci-
sions about their retirement saving, and there 
are consequently many ways to deliberately or 
 inadvertently avoid accumulating substantial 
retirement balances.
Table 11 places the ownership of IRAs, 401(k)s, 
and other DC plans, as well as DB plans, in 
perspective, drawing upon data from the 2010 
Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). Munnell 
Table 11—Household Ownership of Retirement Accounts and Pension Plans, 2010
Positive
account value 
Account value
> $50K
Account value
> $100K Mean (median) balance conditional on positive
Single Married Single Married Single Married Single Married
Panel A. IRA
45–54 19.2 34.2 6.5 17.7 3.3 12.4 $65,177
($21,000)
$145,491
($54,000)
55–64 30.4 48.7 12.6 29.2 7.8 23.2 99,794
(34,000)
211,105
(90,000)
65–74 25.4 50.6 13.4 35.8 9.2 26.7 236,412
(53,000)
282,943
(113,000)
75+ 21.9 43.7 12.6 24.5 8.0 16.2 138,006(55,000)
157,414
(53,000)
Panel B. Defined contribution (DC) pension
45–54 33.2 56.3 10.7 32.9 5.7 23.6 69,248
(22,000)
157,832
(67,000)
55–64 25.6 48.5 8.5 30.2 4.7 21.8 78,588
(28,000)
268,556
(83,000)
65–74 10.0 24.8 2.9 15.1 1.9 11.8 86,283
(26,000)
257,243
(86,000)
75–84 3.1 7.6 1.2 3.4 0.6 2.9 122,638
(30,000)
283,451
(36,000)
Panel C. IRA or DC pension or both
45–54 44.0 68.6 16.1 43.0 9.0 31.0 80,674
(28,000)
202,794
(80,000)
55–64 44.0 70.5 18.1 46.3 9.0 37.7 89,042
(30,000)
318,400
(109,000)
65–74 31.8 61.6 15.8 43.4 11.1 34.2 215,681
(49,000)
332,562
(138,000)
75–84 24.4 47.7 14.1 26.1 8.6 18.2 145,673
(65,000)
206,947
(57,600)
Panel D. Defined benefit (DB) pension
45–54 17.7 25.6 16.1 26.6 13.4 22.4 277,102
(181,674)
343,449
(193,564)
55–64 25.1 40.7 23.0 36.9 19.9 33.2 323,697
(225,932)
388,783
(267,577)
65–74 41.5 49.7 29.4 43.5 22.3 39.4 167,939
(124,967)
403,121
(274,918)
75–84 53.1 62.1 26.2 50.5 17.4 37.1 122,662
(85,102)
195,777
(123,749)
Source: Author’s tabulations using 2010 Survey of Consumer Finances. Entries in columns 2–7 are percentages. DC plans 
include all retirement plans with account balances.
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(2012) reports similar findings with respect to 
401(k)s from the same dataset. The table reports 
data for single and married households. Account 
 balances are typically higher for households 
than for individuals, because some households 
have two members with DC plans or IRAs. In 
addition, data on household balances will show 
much larger values than data on 401(k) or other 
DC plan accounts, for example as reported by 
firms that record-keep for such plans, because an 
individual may have multiple DC accounts as a 
result of having worked for multiple employers.
Table 11 reports entries for four age groups, 
each spanning ten years, beginning with those 
45–54. In each case the age of the household is 
defined as the age of the household head. The 
entries in the first two columns indicate whether 
the household owns the given type of retire-
ment account, while the next six columns are 
related to the value of these accounts. The table 
illustrates the expansion of both DC plan par-
ticipation and IRAs. The entries in panels A and 
B show that the probability of having an IRA 
rises with age, while the probability of having 
a DC plan falls. Married households headed by 
someone between the ages of 55 and 64, for 
example, are about 15 percentage points more 
likely to have an IRA than married households 
ten years younger. This in part reflects the fact 
that IRAs are often funded with roll-over contri-
butions from employer-provided DC plans and, 
in some cases, DB plans. In contrast, among 
65–74-year-old married households, 25 percent 
report having a DC plan; for those 45–64, the 
probability is 56 percent. The diffusion of 
401(k) plans has been well documented using 
a variety of datasets. Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2011c), for example, use SIPP data and find 
patterns very similar to those reported in Table 
10. Married households are substantially more 
likely to report both DC plans and IRAs than are 
their single counterparts.
Table 11 also illustrates two other features 
of the current retirement saving system. First, 
roughly two-thirds of households approaching 
retirement age, those in the 55–64 age group, have 
either a DC plan or an IRA or both. Second, even 
though many households have these accounts, 
a substantial share have accumulated relatively 
little in them, and they are unlikely to be able 
to support a significant flow of retirement con-
sumption with their account balance. The four 
columns in the middle of Table 11 illustrate this. 
The data in panel C show that while 62 percent 
of married households in the 65–74 age group, 
and 32 percent of singles, report having an IRA 
or a DC plan account, only 34 percent of mar-
ried households and 11 percent of singles have 
accumulated more than $100,000, combined, 
in these accounts. There is substantial disper-
sion in plan balances: the mean balance for mar-
ried households in this age group, $332,562, is 
more than 2.5 times the median ($138,000). The 
pattern is similar for those in the 55–64-year-
old age group. While 70 percent of the married 
households report having at least one IRA or DC 
plan account, only 38 percent have more than 
$100,000 in combined account values.
Table 11 also presents information on the cov-
erage of DB plans, and estimates of the expected 
present discounted value (EPDV) of the associ-
ated benefits. The first two rows in panel D show 
that 41 percent of married households aged 
55–64, and 50 percent of those 65–74, report 
some DB plan coverage. The fraction of house-
holds with DB plans declines to 26 percent for 
those aged 45–54.
The EPDV estimates shown in the last two 
columns, which are described in more detail in 
the Appendix, are subject to substantial uncer-
tainty particularly for the age 45–54 and 55–64 
age groups because for these groups it is usually 
necessary to rely on self-reported estimates of 
the amount of prospective DB pension payouts 
and the date at which such payouts will begin. 
The EPDV estimates suggest that for households 
that are now in their late 60s and early 70s, the 
mean value of prospective DB payouts, for those 
with DB plans, is comparable to the mean value 
of DC plan and IRA accumulations, but the 
median value of the DB payouts is substantially 
higher. The pattern is somewhat different for 
55–64-year-olds. For married households in this 
age group, the conditional means are again com-
parable, but for single persons, the conditional 
mean for the DB plans is substantially greater 
than that for the combination of DC plans and 
IRAs. These patterns suggest that the dispersion 
in the combined value of IRAs and DC plans 
is somewhat greater than the dispersion in the 
EPDV of DB plans for those with each type of 
pension coverage.
The finding that for a significant group of 
households approaching retirement, the amount 
accumulated in DC plans and IRAs falls short of 
the EPDV of the DB plans of older cohorts is an 
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essential part of understanding the shifting nature 
of retirement preparation. Butrica et al. (2009) 
simulate the effect of freezing existing private 
sector DB plans and replacing them with DC 
plans. They conclude that such changes would 
generate a distribution of outcomes, with some 
prospective retirees receiving higher retirement 
income and others less. The number of future 
retirees who would receive less income is pro-
jected to exceed the number who would receive 
more, and those receiving less would be concen-
trated among younger cohorts with relatively 
little accumulation in the existing DB plans.
The shifting pattern of retirement plan cov-
erage over the last three decades can be illus-
trated by tracking households in the same birth 
cohort using the synthetic cohorts associated 
with repeated Surveys of Consumer Finances. 
Table 12 applies this approach with the 1992, 
2001, and 2010 surveys. The age ranges are 
nine years wide, which prevents overlap across 
the various intervals. Reading across the table 
shows retirement plan participation for a given 
birth cohort as it ages; reading “up” the table 
shows the age-specific changes for successively 
younger cohorts within a survey wave. The 
first row, for example, shows the percentage of 
households headed by someone born between 
1936 and 1944 that reported participating in a 
DC plan in each of the three surveys. These per-
centages are stable in 1992 (38.5 percent), when 
these household heads were between 48 and 
56 years old, and 2001 (37.4 percent, when the 
household heads were 57 to 65 years old), but 
decline to 18.3 percent in 2010, when the house-
hold heads were between the ages of 66 and 74. 
The table shows that the age-specific rate of DC 
plan coverage rises over time for nearly all age 
groups. For DB plans, the table shows the sharp 
decline in coverage. For those between the ages 
of 38 and 55, the decline in the age-specific rate 
of DB plan coverage was approximately 20 per-
centage points over the 18 year sample period.
The entries down each diagonal in Table 12, 
such as those in bold, track the age-specific 
rate of pension participation. Thus in the sec-
ond panel, in 1992, 50.3 percent of households 
headed by someone between the ages of 48 and 
56 reported DB plan coverage. By twelve years 
later, the percentage of those between 48 and 56 
with DB pension coverage was 39.5 percent, and 
nine years later still, it was 30.1 percent for those 
in this same age group. The last panel shows that 
the age-specific rates of any retirement plan par-
ticipation, combining IRAs, 401(k)s, other DC 
plans, and DB plans, was relatively stable over 
this 1989–2010 period.
Table 11 demonstrates the heterogeneity in 
the retirement saving plan participation of US 
households approaching, and in, retirement. 
Some have no formal saving program at all; 
some have only a DC or a DB plan; some have 
a DB plan, a DC plan, and also have accumu-
lated assets in an IRA. Whether participation 
in different types of plans is complementary, 
or whether participation in one plan substitutes 
for participation in another, is a key empirical 
issue. If the various retirement saving vehicles 
are substitutes, then those with small balances in 
one saving vehicle may have offsetting balances 
in other accounts. Table 13 shows the coverage 
of various retirement plans and the balances in 
these plans for households headed by individu-
als aged 55–64 in 2010. The table focuses on the 
73.6 percent of the respondents in this age group 
who report some type of retirement saving plan. 
Among this group, 32.9 percent report only one 
saving plan; they are in the first panel. At the 
other extreme, 10 percent of households report 
that they have a DB plan, a DC plan, and an 
IRA. Another 28 percent of households report 
Table 12—Repeated Cross-Section Evidence on 
Evolution of Retirement Plan Participation, 
1992–2010
Birth cohort SCF date
1992 2001 2010
Panel A. DC plan
1936–1944 0.385 0.374 0.183
1945–1953 0.371 0.473 0.377
1954–1962 0.316 0.523 0.472
1963–1971 0.215 0.472 0.463
Panel B. DB plan
1936–1944 0.503 0.466 0.439
1945–1953 0.433 0.395 0.395
1954–1962 0.317 0.287 0.301
1963–1971 0.187 0.199 0.217
Panel C. Any retirement account (DB, DC, or IRA)
1936–1944 0.724 0.773 0.661
1945–1953 0.687 0.743 0.715
1954–1962 0.577 0.713 0.688
1963–1971 0.368 0.626 0.622
Source: Author’s tabulations from 2010 Survey of Consumer 
Finances.
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two of these three types of plans. The data do 
not suggest substitution. For those with all three 
types of saving plans, median IRA balances and 
the median EPDV of their DB plans is greater 
than for any of the other groups of households. 
The households that report only one type of plan 
have smaller median balances than those with 
multiple plans. This pattern further suggests 
heterogeneity of the type discussed above; some 
households not only have DB plans but are also 
participating in other retirement saving plans. 
Some but not all of this heterogeneity is income 
related; Venti and Wise (2001) document wide 
variation in retirement saving propensities 
throughout the income distribution.
Before concluding the discussion of the shift 
from DB to DC plans, it is important to recognize 
the range of choices that DC plans permit indi-
viduals to make, and the role that these choices 
play in determining retirement security. DB 
plans provide participants with relatively few 
choices, other than whether to continue working 
for the firm that provides the pension plan, and 
when to retire conditional on continued employ-
ment. These decisions can have a very impor-
tant effect on the value of retirement payouts in 
DB plans. In contrast, individuals who work for 
firms that offer DC plans can choose whether or 
not to participate in the plan, how much to con-
tribute, how to allocate their accumulated assets, 
whether (in many plans) to borrow against their 
accumulated balance, whether, if they change 
jobs, to withdraw their balance as a lump sum 
distribution, how quickly to draw down their 
assets in retirement, and whether to  purchase 
an annuity or to pursue another strategy for 
withdrawing assets. All of these decisions are 
consequential, and they create multiple deci-
sion points at which an individual might make a 
decision that could enhance or impair his retire-
ment security. Critics of the DC structure, such 
as Ghilarducci (2008), point out that many indi-
viduals fail to accumulate substantial retirement 
resources because of choices that they make at 
various decision nodes. Poterba et al. (2007) 
examine the relative riskiness of accumulating 
retirement benefits in private-sector DB and DC 
plans, and underscore that participants face risk 
in both. One of the challenges of a retirement 
system based on a DC structure is providing 
individuals with enough information and train-
ing to make responsible decisions regarding 
whatever choices they are provided.
In the last fifteen years, changes in the regula-
tory and legislative environment surrounding DC 
plans have allowed some firms that offer 401(k) 
plans to adopt a more “default-oriented” model 
that utilizes automatic enrollment when employ-
ees join the firm and relies on default asset allo-
cations. Mitchell and Utkus (2012) estimate that 
about one-fifth of the plan participants in their 
sample of 401(k) plans managed by Vanguard 
were enrolled in plans that featured automatic 
enrollment. Close to 60 percent of the new hires 
at firms in their sample were auto-enrolled. Firms 
confront a difficult problem in this setting when 
they must choose plan defaults. Most 401(k) plan 
default contribution rates are below the rates that 
participants would need to save at in order to accu-
mulate retirement resources that could replace 
a significant fraction of their pre-retirement 
income. Vanguard (2013) reports that a contribu-
tion rate of 3 percent is the predominant default 
rate. Moreover, the choice of a default can affect 
the active decisions of plan participants. Carroll 
et al. (2009) examine these issues and begin to 
develop a theory of optimal default design.
The empirical evidence on participant behav-
ior in DC plans provides further support for the 
theme of household heterogeneity. While some 
individuals make choices that may place their 
retirement security in jeopardy, aggregate sta-
tistics suggest that many plan participants make 
decisions that seem broadly consistent with the 
recommendations of many financial advisers. At 
the end of 2012, for example, VanDerhei et al. 
Table 13—Overlap in Retirement Saving Vehicles, 
Households Aged 55–64, 2010
Percentage of 
households
Median balances (000s)
DC DB IRA
Panel A. One retirement plan only 
DC plan 11.0 26
DB plan 11.1 205
IRA 10.8 46
Panel B. Two retirement plans
DC & DB  7.8 45 192
DC & IRA 10.5 120 65
IRA & DB  9.7 312 52
Panel C. Three retirement plans 
IRA, DB, & DC 9.8 100 360 85
Source: Author’s tabulations from 2010 Survey of Consumer 
Finances.
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(2013) estimate 61 percent of 401(k) assets 
were invested in stocks, while 33 percent were 
invested in bonds or similar fixed-income invest-
ments. Older participants have less stock expo-
sure than their younger counterparts. The share 
of 401(k) assets invested in company stock, an 
investment choice that increases a household’s 
exposure to the fortunes of a firm with which 
it already has an employment relationship, was 
7 percent. Company stock allocations in 401(k) 
plans have fallen by more than half since 1999, 
before the collapse of Enron, a firm at which 
many employees had invested their 401(k) plan 
assets in company stock. Loans outstanding 
represent 13 percent of current 401(k) balances.
Some assets are withdrawn from the 401(k) 
system before retirement. Fellowes and Willemin (2013) highlight these pre-retirement outflows, 
which weaken retirement security. Among those 
near retirement, withdrawals are relatively low. 
Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2011c) report that the 
annual average rate of withdrawal from personal 
retirement accounts, a combination of IRAs and 
401(k)s, for households headed by someone in 
their 60s is about 2 percent; this rises to close 
to 6 percent after the account-holding individu-
als pass the age of 70, when required minimum 
distributions come into play.
One of the most important decisions that 
DC plan participants must make is how much 
to contribute to their plan. Butrica and Smith (2012) report a median contribution rate, based 
on SIPP data, of 5.0 percent in 2010, with 
a range from 4.7 to 5.2 between 1990 and 
2010. In 2010, as in earlier years, there is an 
upward slope in the age-contribution percent-
age profile. Median contribution rates rise 
from 3.1 percent for those in their 20s to 6.3 
percent for those between the ages of 60 and 
64. These contribution amounts reflect only 
employee contributions. Since many employ-
ers provide a substantial matching contribution 
when employees contribute, often 50 percent, 
the share of salary being contributed to 401(k) 
plans is larger than 5 percent.
VI. Retirement Saving in a Low-Return 
Environment
The capacity of an individual saver to accu-
mulate wealth for retirement, whether through 
an employer sponsored DC plan, an IRA, or 
through saving outside such plans, is a  function 
of the rate of return that accumulating assets 
can earn and the horizon over which the assets 
are invested. Accumulating retirement wealth 
and drawing income from a stock of assets 
once accumulated are both more challenging 
in a period of low expected returns. A decline 
in  prospective returns, like the one that has 
occurred in bond markets during the last six 
years, affects those who are saving for retire-
ment as well as those who are at or near retire-
ment, because the income that their accumulated 
assets can generate may fall below their pre-
retirement expectations. This section explores 
the effect of changes in expected returns on the 
saving rates needed to accumulate a given level 
of retirement resources.
The riskless real returns available to savers 
have varied substantially during the last decade. 
The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED 
database reports that the real yield on newly-
issued 20-year Treasury Inflation Protected 
Securities (TIPS) declined from an average 
of 2.18 percent in the last six months of 2004, 
when these bonds were first available, to 0.75 
percent in 2013. Over this period the high-
est average yield was 2.36 percent in 2007; 
the 2012 average value, 0.22 percent, was the 
lowest, and there were some months in 2012 
when the yield was negative. While the 20-year 
TIPS data series only begins in 2004, a few 
years earlier investors could obtain even higher 
long-term  inflation-protected real returns in 
other bonds. In November, 2000, for example, 
a newly-issued federal I-bond, an inflation-
protected savings bond, offered a real return of 
3.4 percent.
The decline in real riskless yields in the 
last decade makes it more difficult for a saver 
to reach a wealth target at a fixed retirement 
age. Consider the accumulated retirement 
wealth that a saver will accumulate, as a share 
of final earnings, from saving 1 percent of 
earnings each year for T years. Assume that 
real earnings rise 1 percent each year. If earn-
ings at the start of the saving plan are nor-
malized to 1.0, final earnings are therefore 
w(T ) = (1.01)T. The value in period T of 1 per-
cent of salary, saved in period s ≤ T, is
(3) V(s, T ) = 0.01 × (1.01)s 
 × (1 + r)(T − s).
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The total value of retirement saving over a T 
period career, R(T ), is then
(4) R(T ) =  ∑ 
s=0
T−1
0.01 × (1.01)s 
 × (1 + r)(T − s).
Table 14 reports the value of wealth at retire-
ment scaled by final earnings, R(T )/W (T ). The 
table considers careers lasting 20, 30, and 40 
years, and real rates of return between 1 and 4 
percent per year. The table shows that when the 
real return is 2 percent and the length of a working 
career is 40 years, saving 1 percent of earnings 
each year leads to a wealth stock at retirement 
equal to 0.49 times final earnings. Saving 5 per-
cent of earnings each year for 40 years would 
result in a retirement wealth-to-income ratio of 
2.45 (= 5 × 0.49). If the real interest rate is 2 per-
cent per year, shifting the saving horizon from 40 
to 20 years reduces the wealth-to-earnings ratio 
per percentage point of saving from 0.49 to 0.22, 
a decline of more than 50 percent. Raising the 
rate of return from 2 percent per year to 4 percent 
per year has a pronounced effect when the saving 
horizon is long. For the 20 year saving horizon, it 
increases the incremental wealth-to-income ratio 
from 0.22 to 0.27, but for the 40 year horizon, 
from 0.49 to 0.77.
The calculations in Table 14 suggest that 
someone who saves 6 percent of her salary start-
ing at age 35, and who retires at age 65, will 
accumulate a stock of retirement assets equal to 
2.1 times her final wage if the real return is 2 
percent, and 2.94 times her final wage if the real 
return is 4 percent. This underscores the impor-
tance of starting early to accumulate retirement 
wealth, as well as the challenge that a low-return 
environment poses for retirement savers.
The discussion of retirement saving in previ-
ous sections focused on the value of assets in 
IRAs and DC plans for various cohorts, high-
lighting the low accumulations in many of these 
accounts. For those who have accumulated sub-
stantial assets, however, it is natural to ask what 
fraction of final salary can be replaced by an 
annuity purchased at retirement. There is a large 
literature on the demand for annuities, and the 
extent to which annuities should feature in an 
optimal retirement plan. Brown (2008) provides 
an introduction. To convert a wealth stock into 
an annuity for individuals or married couples, 
one needs data on the annuity stream that can 
be purchased per dollar of wealth at retirement. 
If a(T ) denotes the annual annuity payment for 
an annuity purchased in year T, then an indi-
vidual’s earnings replacement rate in period T is 
a(T ) × R(T )/W (T ).
Table 15 reports the payout rate in October 
2013 for an annuity on the life of a 65-year-old 
man, a 65-year-old woman, and for a married 
couple (65-year-old man with a 60-year-old 
spouse) purchasing a second-to-die annuity 
with full payments continuing for the surviving 
spouse. The payouts on a range of annuity prod-
ucts offered by different insurance companies 
are reported each quarter in the Annuity Shopper. 
The table shows the average value across all the 
policies presented in the October 2013 issue. 
For example, the average annual payout for the 
annuities offering joint and survivor protection 
for a 65-year-old husband and 60-year-old wife, 
and costing $100,000, was $5,364 per year, or 
0.054 times the premium value. All of the annui-
ties provide monthly payouts; the table shows the 
simple sum of the twelve monthly payouts as a 
share of the purchase price. The table shows that 
annuity payouts for men are higher than those 
for women on account of the higher mortality 
rate for men, and that the payouts are substan-
tially lower when the annuity contract promises 
a 3 percent annual increase. For all three annuity 
contracts, those for men, women, and couples, 
selecting the 3 percent escalation provision 
reduces the initial payout by 26 percent.
The information in Table 15 can be com-
bined with the wealth-to-earnings calcula-
tions in Table 14 to illustrate the annuity 
replacement rate that will be generated by 
a given saving strategy over the course of an 
individual’s career. For example, if the long-
term real rate of return is 2 percent, then the 
replacement rate that will result from saving 
1 percent of salary each year over a 40 year 
career is the entry in Table 14 for r = 0.02 and 
Table 14—Wealth-to-Earnings Ratio at Retirement 
from 1 Percent Annual Saving
Years of saving r = 0.04 r = 0.03 r = 0.02 r = 0.01
20 0.28 0.26 0.22 0.20
30 0.49 0.41 0.35 0.30
40 0.77 0.61 0.49 0.40
Source: Author’s calculations.
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T = 40, 0.49, times the  annuity payout rate 
from Table 15. The latter value is 0.069 for 
the nominal annuity and 0.051 for the 3 per-
cent indexed annuity. These values are respec-
tively 0.034 and 0.025. Thus if the goal is to 
save enough to purchase an annuity that will 
replace half of one’s earnings at  retirement, the 
required saving rate is 14.8 percent of salary (= 0.50/0.034) for the nominal annuity and 20 
percent of salary (= 0.50/0.025) for the 3 per-
cent increasing annuity. If the saving horizon 
is just ten years shorter, 30 years, the required 
saving rate is substantially higher in both cases.
It is important to note that the Annuity 
Shopper data from October 2013 correspond to 
a month when the yield on 20-year TIPS was 
1.05 percent, so the data on annuity payouts in 
Table 15 are best paired with low rate of return 
assumptions in the accumulation phase. In 
an environment with higher safe real interest 
rates, such as the 4 percent considered in Table 
14, the annual payouts on annuities like those 
in Table 15 that cost $100,000 would likely be 
greater than the observed market payouts in 
late 2013.
Table 16 reports required saving rates to 
replace half of earnings at retirement for various 
permutations of career lengths, rates of return, 
and annuity choice. The calculations suggest 
that saving rates like the median 401(k) con-
tribution rate are unlikely to enable prospective 
retirees to replace half of their final earnings. 
This finding must be viewed against the back-
drop of the earlier evidence on Social Security 
replacement rates. For those in the lower strata 
of the income distribution, even low replace-
ment rates from saving through DC plans or 
IRAs may yield total replacement rates that per-
mit post-retirement consumption at a level not 
far below the household’s pre-retirement level.
The calculations in Tables 14 and 16 assume 
that investors earn riskless returns, when in fact 
most DC plan and IRA assets are invested in 
assets with uncertain real returns. Addressing 
the risks associated with accumulating assets 
for retirement, and then converting them into 
income streams, is a key aspect of retirement 
planning. Raising the riskiness of the assets 
held in a retirement portfolio can offer the pros-
pect of higher expected returns, but at the price 
Table 15—Annual Payouts Per Dollar of Annuity Premium, October 2013 
Life 
annuity
Life annuity with 
3% annual escalation
Life annuity with 
20 years certain
Male, age 65 0.069 0.051 0.060
Female, age 65 0.064 0.047 0.058
Joint & survivor, male 65 and female 60, 100% survivor income 0.054 0.037 0.053
Joint & survivor, male 70 and female 65, 100% survivor income 0.059 0.043 0.057
Source: Annuity Shopper (2013).
Table 16—Annual Saving Rate ( percent) Required to Support Annuity Stream 
Equal to Half of Final Earnings at 65
Working
career
Real 
return
Men Women 
Nominal 
annuity
3% increasing 
annuity
Nominal 
annuity
3% increasing 
annuity
20 0.02 32.7 44.3 35.3 48.2
30 0.02 20.7 28.1 22.4 30.5
40 0.02 14.8 20.0 15.9 21.7
20 0.03 27.7 37.5 29.9 40.8
30 0.03 17.6 23.9 19.0 26.0
40 0.03 11.9 16.1 12.8 17.5
20 0.04 26.4 35.7 28.4 38.8
30 0.04 14.9 20.2 16.1 22.0
40 0.04 9.4 12.8 10.2 13.9
Source: Author’s calculations.
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of greater dispersion in the range of retirement 
wealth values.
The discussion of the effect of real interest 
rates on annuity payouts highlights another 
important risk which has not received as much 
attention as accumulation risk: annuitization 
risk. In 1993, when the average yield on AAA 
corporate bonds was 7.9 percent, the annual 
payout per dollar of annuity premium for a 
single-premium immediate annuity purchased 
by a 65-year-old male was 9.7 percent. Twelve 
years later, in 2005, when the AAA rate was 5.4 
percent, the annuity payout was 7.8 percent. In 
2013, when the AAA rate averaged 3.8 percent, 
the annuity payout was 6.3 percent. An indi-
vidual who had been accumulating resources 
with the goal of financing a specific retirement 
income target would have needed 24 percent 
more wealth in 2013 than in 2005 to meet this 
goal. Merton (2012) argues that retirement plan-
ning should focus on generating a consumption 
stream in retirement, not a stock of wealth at the 
date of retirement, since it is consumption that 
ultimately determines well-being. While capital 
risk, the risk to principal, in retirement accumu-
lation is widely discussed, Merton draws atten-
tion to income risk, the risk to the household’s 
feasible stream of income in retirement, and 
suggests a variety of strategies for hedging this 
risk. This is an ongoing topic of research at the 
intersection of financial economics and financial 
planning.
VII. Raising Saving Rates: Insights from 
Behavioral Economics
The data on retirement saving by the cohort 
of households now approaching retirement 
suggests that a significant subset may need to 
raise their saving rate if they hope to avoid a 
decline in consumption after retirement. Their 
plight is likely to be worse if financial markets 
deliver returns below their historical averages 
for a substantial part of the next decade. These 
observations lead naturally to the question of 
whether there are public or private policies that 
might raise private saving. While historically 
public policy has focused on tax incentives 
such as the “consumption tax” treatment of 
IRA and pension accumulations as a means to 
encourage retirement saving, these approaches 
have recently been complemented by insights 
from behavioral economics.
One reason behavioral approaches may be 
helpful is that many households have on limited 
financial literacy. Lusardi and Mitchell (forth-
coming) present the findings of a “financial 
literacy module” of the Health and Retirement 
Study. Respondents were asked three questions: (i) If $100 earns 2 percent per year for 5 years, 
how much will you have in the account? (more 
than $102, exactly $102, less than $102); (ii) If 
the interest rate on your savings account is 1 per-
cent per year, and inflation is 2 percent, can you 
buy more, the same, or less in a year?; and (iii) 
Buying a single company stock usually provides 
a safer return than a stock of a mutual fund. True 
or False? The probabilities that respondents 
answered these questions correctly were 67, 75, 
and 52 percent, respectively; only 34 percent 
answered all three correctly. The power of com-
pound interest and incentives based on prospec-
tive rates of return may have limited influence 
for those without a rudimentary command of the 
mechanics of saving.
A substantial body of work over the last fif-
teen years has explored strategies for raising sav-
ing that do not rely on price incentives, such as 
the creative use of defaults in corporate 401(k) 
plans. Madrian and Shea (2001) were one of the 
first to document that the saving behavior of a 
substantial fraction of newly-hired employees is 
affected by default provisions in DC plans. Choi 
et al. (2004) study the experience of a number 
of companies that switched from a voluntary 
401(k) plan to an “opt-out” structure. They find 
sharp increases in 401(k) participation rates for 
each of the firms they study. Card and Ransom (2011) find that individuals do not regard per-
sonal and employer contributions to retirement 
saving plans as perfect substitutes, and that they 
save more when the employee contribution is 
low than when it is high, even if this is fully off-
set by variation in employer contributions.
Recent evidence on the saving behavior of 
Danish households further supports the impor-
tance of default provisions. Chetty et al. (2012) 
find that when employer contributions to retire-
ment saving arrangements change, up to 85 per-
cent of the affected individuals make no change 
in their personal saving plans, even though by 
making such changes they could hold constant 
their total, employer plus employee, saving rate. 
They describe the group that does not respond 
as “passive savers,” and suggest that for this 
group, public and private initiatives that rely on 
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 individuals taking action may have relatively 
little effect on saving behavior.
Benartzi and Thaler (2013) present a strategy 
for increasing retirement saving that focuses 
on expanding eligibility for employment-based 
saving plans, and then relying on automatic 
enrollment, automatic asset allocation rules, and 
automatic escalation of the fraction of salary 
that is contributed to the plan to help accumulate 
retirement wealth. The evidence that automatic 
enrollment can increase contributions to DC 
plans for some employees who might not oth-
erwise save through this channel partly explains 
the recent growth of various default-oriented 
plans that was noted above.
Observing that many households do not 
understand key principles of retirement saving 
and do not respond when the saving environ-
ment changes does not imply that price-based 
saving incentives cannot raise saving and retire-
ment preparedness. These incentives may not 
work, however, for households in this group. A 
key research issue that bears on policy design is 
the extent of overlap between the set of house-
holds that are price-sensitive with regard to 
retirement saving and the set of households that 
are on a trajectory that will result in too little 
retirement saving to sustain their pre-retirement 
living standard in retirement.
VIII. Conclusion
Declining old-age mortality has important 
consequences for individual lifecycle planning 
and for aggregate economic analysis. For indi-
viduals, it implies a need to plan for potentially 
longer retirement spans, or longer working lives, 
and to adjust saving plans accordingly. For the 
US economy at large, it implies rising fiscal bur-
dens as a result of a rising share of the popu-
lation receiving benefits from Social Security, 
Medicare, and Medicaid, and a decline in num-
ber of individuals who are working relative to 
the number in the population. An aging popula-
tion may also be associated with a declining rate 
of innovation.
There is widespread variation in the sources 
of income support for the elderly population in 
the United States. Individuals who are over 65 
whose incomes fall below the median rely dis-
proportionately on Social Security for retire-
ment income. Those in the top quartile display 
a more varied mix of income sources, with 
 earnings, pension income, and income from 
assets all making significant contributions to 
their support. The importance of Social Security 
for those in the lower income range implies that 
changes in the benefits associated with this pro-
gram, for this group, would be likely to translate 
directly into changes in living standards.
The structure of private-sector retirement 
arrangements has undergone substantial change 
in the last three decades. Many defined  benefit 
pension plans for existing employees in the 
private sector have been capped or frozen, and 
new employees and those at new firms are much 
more likely to be covered by defined contribu-
tion plans than by defined benefit plans. In the 
public sector, in contrast, defined benefit plans 
remain prevalent. Defined contribution plans 
place more responsibilities for securing an ade-
quate retirement income on individuals, who can 
choose whether to participate in their retirement 
plan, how much to contribute, how to invest, 
and how and when to draw down the assets they 
have accumulated. The multiplicity of decision 
nodes in the defined contribution system places 
a greater reliance on building financial literacy, 
and on using the insights from behavioral eco-
nomics to support future retirement security, 
than the defined benefit system did.
Retirement saving is affected by many pub-
lic policies: Social Security, Medicare, and 
Medicaid; the eligibility rules for a range of 
other transfer programs; the tax rules and other 
regulations affecting pension plans; and the 
wide array of regulatory and other policies that 
affect the behavior of financial institutions that 
supply retirement saving products. Designing 
public policy toward retirement security must 
recognize both the heterogeneity among house-
holds saving for retirement, as well as the mul-
tiple policy objectives that are served by various 
policy instruments.
In thinking about retirement security, it may be 
helpful to focus on three distinct groups: those in 
lower income strata who are likely to find it dif-
ficult to engage in private saving, and for whom 
Social Security is the primary source of retirement 
income; those at moderate incomes, for whom 
expanding access to retirement saving vehicles 
and encouraging saving through those vehicles 
could raise retirement preparedness; and those at 
the highest income levels, for whom the private 
sector defined contribution structure provides 
a range of opportunities for saving. The study 
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of pension policy by Barr and Diamond (2008) 
illustrates the many trade-offs that policy-makers 
must confront in designing both public retirement 
support programs and the retirement saving struc-
tures that complement them, and illustrates these 
trade-offs with a range of country studies.
One of the consequences of the aging US 
population that can be predicted with near cer-
tainty is the continuing demand for analysis of 
the economic effects of this demographic shift.
Appendix
Computing the Expected Present Discounted 
Value of DB Payouts for SCF Respondents
To compare the value of DC plan accumula-
tions with the value of prospective payments 
in DB plans, it is necessary to construct the 
expected present discounted value (EPDV) of 
future DB payouts. For households in the SCF 
that report current income from DB plans, this 
involves projecting the current benefit flow 
forward, recognizing the prospective mortality 
experience of the beneficiary and the possibility 
of survivor benefits in married couples, and then 
constructing the EPDV. The DB payouts are 
always assumed to take the form of an annuity. If 
an SCF respondent reports that his DB payments 
are protected by a cost of living adjustment (COLA), the current payment is discounted at 
the real interest rate and the age-specific mortal-
ity rates that apply to the respondent. The real 
interest rate is defined as the annual average 
yield for 2010 on long-term AAA bonds, 4.94 
percent (as reported in Table H.15 of Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2013), 
minus the expected ten-year inflation rate for the 
year 2010 as reported by the Livingston Survey 
that is carried out by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Philadelphia (2013). If the participant reports 
that the benefits are not COLA-protected, the 
reported payout is discounted at the nominal 
interest rate. If the respondent does not report 
whether the benefits are inflation-protected, the 
benefits are assumed to grow at 0.4 times the 
expected inflation rate each year, and the result-
ing benefit stream is discounted at the AAA 
rate. Mortality is projected using the cohort life 
tables from Bell and Miller (2005), interpolated 
as necessary. If the respondent is married and 
reports that pension benefits will continue after 
the primary beneficiary’s death, the spouse is 
assumed to receive the full value of the pension 
if he or she outlives the primary beneficiary. If 
there is no information on spousal benefits, a 
surviving spouse is assumed to receive a 50 per-
cent continuing payout.
For SCF respondents who are currently work-
ing and who report that they will receive DB 
benefits when they retire from their current job, 
retirement is assumed to occur at age 65. When 
the benefits are specified as a fraction of final 
salary, nominal earnings are assumed to rise by 
3 percent per year until age 58, then by 1 percent 
per year until 65; Card and Ransom (2011) make 
a similar assumption about the wage trajectory.
A number of previous studies have attempted 
to estimate the value of prospective DB plan pay-
outs, and it is helpful to place the entries in panel 
D of Table 11 in context. Gustman, Steinmeier, 
and Tabatabai (GST) (2012) use data from the 
Health and Retirement Study to compute house-
hold balance sheets in 2006 and 2010. For house-
holds that had DB pensions in both years, they 
estimate the average 2010 value of a DB pension 
to be $314,000, compared with an average value 
of $162,000 for DC plans conditional on having 
a plan. For those with IRAs, the average value in 
2010 was $216,000, again conditional on a posi-
tive value. The entries in Table 11 are broadly 
consistent with GST’s (2012) estimates for DB 
plans, but the value of DC holdings in Table 11 
exceeds their HRS-based estimates. This pattern 
has been noted before; Venti (2011) discusses 
a number of reasons for under-reporting of DC 
plan balances in the HRS.
Gale and Pence (2006) present estimates of 
DB wealth in both the HRS and the SCF for 1992. 
They focus on households that were headed by 
someone aged 51 to 61 in 1992, and report aver-
age DB wealth across all households of $95,808 
for the SCF and $106,041 for the HRS, again sug-
gesting that the two surveys yield similar results. 
Wolff (2011) calculates DB pension wealth in 
multiple waves of the SCF between 1983 and 
2007. His estimate of average DB wealth for 
households over the age of 65 in 2007 is $91,200, 
somewhat lower than the value that would be 
implied by the EPDV estimates in Table 11. 
Importantly, he also presents Gini coefficients 
for both DB wealth and the balances in DC 
plans, and reports less dispersion for DB plans. 
Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2013) calculate mean 
holdings of IRAs and DC plans of $121,137 for 
65–69-year-old households in the HRS in 2008, 
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and $99,147 for the EPDV of DB pension ben-
efits for this group. Within this age group, 52 per-
cent report ownership of a DC plan or an IRA, 
and 42 percent report having a DB plan.
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